The normativity of truth in cognitive evaluation by Vaus, Sander
UNIVERSITY OF TARTU 
INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY AND SEMIOTICS 
Tartu 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
Sander Vaus 
 
The Normativity of Truth in Cognitive Evaluation 
 
Bachelor’s thesis in philosophy 
 
 
Supervisor: Professor Dr. Daniel Cohnitz 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vaus, The Normativity of Truth in Cognitive Evaluation 
2 
 
Contents 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 3 
1. Cognitive Pluralism ............................................................................................................ 5 
1.1 Is bad reasoning conceptually possible? .................................................................. 5 
1.2 Is bad reasoning biologically possible? .................................................................... 8 
2. Evaluative-Concept Pluralism and its Bearing on “Analytic Epistemology” .................. 12 
2.1 Conceptual analysis .................................................................................................... 12 
2.2 Epistemic intuitions .................................................................................................... 13 
2.3 The task of epistemology ........................................................................................... 14 
3. The Normative Function of Truth in Epistemology ......................................................... 16 
3.1 On the value of truth ................................................................................................... 16 
3.1.1 Causal/functional theory of the semantic properties of mental states ................. 17 
3.1.2 The limits and idiosyncrasies of the interpretation function ............................... 18 
3.1.3 The value of true beliefs ...................................................................................... 21 
3.2 Is truth a pre-eminent epistemic value? ...................................................................... 24 
3.2.1 Cognitive evaluation vs. epistemic evaluation .................................................... 25 
3.2.2 How a more truth-conducive cognitive system is worse for attaining the things 
that an agent values ...................................................................................................... 28 
3.2.3 The pre-eminence of truth in second-order beliefs ............................................. 30 
3.2.4 How Kornblith fails to overcome Stich’s attack on the value of truth ................ 31 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 33 
References ............................................................................................................................ 35 
Tõe normatiivne roll kognitiivsete süsteemide hindamisel .................................................. 37 
 
 
Vaus, The Normativity of Truth in Cognitive Evaluation 
3 
 
Introduction 
In this essay I will defend Stephen Stich’s pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation. The most 
striking feature of his view is that it doesn’t place truth center-stage as a criterion of a good 
cognitive system. In fact, he argues that having true beliefs is of little value, both intrinsically 
and instrumentally, and what we should really want is to have beliefs that allow us to attain 
the things that we actually value. This view is contested by Hilary Kornblith, who argues that 
even if truth is not something we value intrinsically, then it is always of instrumental value for 
attaining the things that we actually want to attain. For him, truth plays a pre-eminent role in 
cognitive evaluation, and placing value on truth is thus pragmatically preferable. 
Interestingly, both accounts share a lot of common ground, stemming from their critical views 
on the classical analytic approach to epistemology. The method of conceptual analysis that 
relies on pre-theoretic epistemic intuitions for developing its theories is for both unreliable. 
Kornblith is critical of epistemic intuitions because they are messy and lacking in the kind of 
theoretical rigor that an investigation of knowledge, understood by him as a natural kind, 
would require. Stich’s problem with pre-theoretic intuitions is that they are learned and 
culturally derived, and building up epistemological theories from the basis of the idiosyncratic 
intuitions of male Western philosophers, amounts to either epistemic chauvinism or some 
form of ethnographic epistemology. Both accounts also appreciate the normative dimension 
of epistemology, but it is in the details of how this normativity should manifest that they 
disagree on. 
In the first chapter I will present the empirical thesis of cognitive pluralism – that there are 
significant and systematic differences in the ways different people go about cognition. While 
there is a lot of empirical evidence for this thesis, it will also have to be shown to be tenable 
on conceptual and biological grounds. Establishing cognitive diversity is necessary for further 
considerations of cognitive evaluation, for to properly evaluate different cognitive 
mechanisms, such mechanisms must be shown to actually diverge in some significant sense. 
In the second chapter I will turn to criticize the tradition of analytic epistemology. Relevant to 
this is another empirical thesis – evaluative-concept pluralism, which maintains that there are 
significant and systematic differences in the epistemic concepts and judgments that people 
employ in evaluating cognition. This undermines the intuition-driven methodology of analytic 
epistemology, as the intuitions employed in building up such epistemological theories are 
shown to be non-uniform among the population. There is also empirical evidence for 
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evaluative-concept pluralism, in the face of which, holding onto the analytic method will turn 
out to constitute something that Stich calls ethno-epistemology. 
In the third chapter I will turn to the issue of the normativity of truth in cognitive evaluation. I 
will first present Stich’s argument for why true beliefs, understood for what they are, turn out 
to have little value in our cognition. Then I will turn to Kornblith’s criticism of Stich’s view. I 
will show it to misread Stich on several accounts, and to fail at establishing the pre-eminent 
value of truth that he insists upon. 
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1. Cognitive Pluralism 
In his famous “Epistemology Naturalized”, Quine presents his view of epistemology as being 
nothing more than a chapter of psychology, i.e. it falls into the scope of the natural sciences 
(Quine 1969: 82). A common objection to this view is that it robs epistemology of its 
normative force. This becomes a problem when one of the tasks of epistemology is taken to 
be the evaluation of our cognitive mechanisms. Understood this way, an important part of the 
epistemological project is that of improving the strategies of reasoning that we employ in our 
everyday doings. The importance of such a project is partly due to the “bleak” results from a 
number of studies by experimental psychologists that show humans to often reason very badly 
in predictable ways (cf. Nisbett and Ross 1980). This naturally raises the question of how we 
are to determine that an instance of reasoning is a bad one, and if it is shown to be so, then 
how are we to go about fixing it. To answer these questions, we will first have to know if the 
divergence in people’s reasoning is genuine, and this is where cognitive pluralism comes to 
play. 
Pointing to empirical evidence of cognitive pluralism isn’t enough to make a good case for it. 
While quite a lot of such evidence has surfaced in the works of Richard Nisbett and his 
colleagues (cf. Nisbett and Peng 1999; Nisbett et al. 2001; Nisbett 2003), any divergence 
from the norm could still be chalked up to conceptual confusion, linguistic divergence, 
suspect methodology and so forth. This is of great importance when considering views that 
imply the impossibility of significant cognitive diversity. Stich (1990) criticizes two lines of 
arguments for such a view. First of them argues against the possibility of significant cognitive 
divergence from a conceptual angle, and the second one turns on biology. Both arguments are 
framed in terms of “bad reasoning”, namely that humans cannot genuinely reason badly. 
1.1 Is bad reasoning conceptually possible? 
The assertion that it is simply incoherent to maintain that a person’s cognitive processing 
could deviate without limit from the standards of rationality can be implicitly found in 
Quine’s “Words and Object”, where he maintains that implications of seemingly bad 
reasoning are best understood as a problem of translation (Stich 1990: 29). So if certain 
natives of another language are said to sincerely accept as true certain sentences that are by 
our standards clearly wrong (‘p and not p’ for example), then it’s more likely a case of bad 
translation or linguistic divergence, rather than the respective natives’ “silliness” (Quine 
1960: 58-9). Employing the widely shared language of thought paradigm which maintains 
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that mental processes are best viewed as manipulations and transformations of internalized, 
sentence-like representations, Stich stresses a strong parallelism between the project of 
translating a speaker’s sincere assertions and the project of interpreting or intentionally 
characterizing a person’s mental states. Viewed in this light, Quine’s argument isn’t a mere 
contribution to the theory of translation, but an attempt to set out some conditions 
constraining the intentional characterization of a speaker’s beliefs. Namely that, beyond a 
certain point, silliness of belief is exceedingly unlikely. (Stich 1990: 33-4) According to Stich, 
Quine’s view is also properly understood as an a priori conceptual truth (pp. 36-7). Taken a 
posteriori, it would be simply question begging: in order to determine whether someone is 
reasoning badly, we would have to interpret their words using some translation manual, while 
any acceptable translation manual is written by already eschewing the ascription of silly 
belief. However, as a conceptual truth, Quine’s view seems to be an assertion that intentional 
describability requires some degree of rationality. This naturally raises the question of how 
much rationality is required and how it should manifest. 
Stich criticizes three answers to this question. One defended by Daniel Dennett, which calls 
for “perfect rationality”. A weaker view defended by Martin Hollis, which maintains that 
there are certain rational “bridgehead” inferences shared by all humans. And the weakest view 
of “minimal rationality”, which only requires that an intentionally describable agent manifests 
some reasonable subset of possible rational inferences. (p. 39-43) The details of each account 
and their shortcomings are currently of little consequence, but what’s important is that they all 
share a common implicit assumption. That in order for mental states to be characterizable in 
intentional terms, they must interact with each other and the environment in ways that are 
similar to our own (p. 48).  
This requirement of similarity stems, according to Stich, from Quine’s “principle of charity”, 
which requires that when you are translating some speaker’s language, you should make sure 
that most of their sincere assertions turn out to be true and most of their inferences turn out to 
be rational (p. 44). A more feasible reformulation of that principle, Grandy’s “principle of 
humanity”, maintains that we should opt for translations on which the pattern of relations 
among beliefs, desires, and the world be as similar to our own as possible. (pp. 44-5) 
Intentional description thus presumes that the cognition of the one we’re describing can be 
categorized into states that play belief-like and desire-like roles, and in providing an 
intentional description of an agent in a sentence like ‘S believes that p’ we are in fact 
attributing to them a belief state similar to the one which would underlie our own assertion of 
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‘p’ were we just then to have sincerely uttered ‘p’. The relevant aspects and the requisite 
degree of similarity are themselves largely determined by context. (p. 49) Understood this 
way, the minimal rationality condition is thus a byproduct of the principle of humanity, which 
itself obtains because in providing intentional descriptions we characterize other people’s 
cognitive states by their similarity to our own (p. 50). 
Stich uses an example to show that intentional description thus explicated is seriously limited 
(pp. 52-3). Taking mental processes to be certain manipulations and transformations of 
internalized, sentence-like representations, we can imagine a hypothetical scenario where we 
have a sequence of people, each of whom has brains that exploit the same class of formal 
structures, thus having syntactically identical “languages of thought”, and each manipulates 
these structures according to exactly the same rules. Then we assume those people to differ 
only in one respect, namely that for each person down the sequence they will have exactly one 
belief-sentence different from the previous person. Viewed holistically, each sequent pair of 
persons will be very similar to each other and any attempt to divide those people into two 
classes (those describable in intentional terms, and those not) would be ill-motivated. When 
adopting the perspective of the first person in the sequence, however, a division will be 
necessary. Those close to us will have intentionally characterizable states, and those very far 
away will not. The same picture could also be altered to keep the belief-sentences fixed, while 
incrementally changing the principles that govern how the belief-sentence inscriptions interact 
with one another. Those close to us will again be intentionally chracterizable, and those far 
away will not. 
The conceptual arguments against cognitive diversity revolve around fixing the limits of how 
badly people can reason to their intentional describability. This in turn rests on how similar 
those people are to us cognitively – in the belief tokens they manifest and the principles that 
govern how those tokens interact with one another. It distinguishes “real” beliefs from 
“belief-like” states and “real” inferences from other “inference-like” processes, all on the 
basis of their degree of similarity to our own. Such a stance is seen by Stich as following the 
“capricious contours of intentional describability”, one that will never be sufficiently clear-
cut, and one that could be easily overcome by adopting a less chauvinistic epistemic 
vocabulary (p. 53). Given all the empirical evidence showing that people do in fact reason in 
different ways, this seems like just the thing to do. 
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1.2 Is bad reasoning biologically possible? 
Another line of argument against cognitive pluralism is that systematic bad reasoning is 
simply biologically impossible. This is a view that rests on two premises: (1) evolution 
produces organisms with good approximations to optimally well-designed characteristics or 
systems, and (2) an optimally well-designed cognitive system is a rational cognitive system 
(Stich 1990: 56). For the first premise, the notion of a well-designed system will itself have to 
be explicated in terms of biological fitness, so an organism with such a system will be more 
likely to survive and reproduce successfully. From that, natural selection is supposed to 
choose the most fitness-enhancing genetically coded characteristic or system from all those 
available in the gene pool. Over a long period of time, we’ll be left with a system that is about 
as well designed as it is possible to be, and the cognitive system we’re left with will be very 
near optimal in the business of enhancing our biological fitness. (p. 57) From this and the 
second premise, we are to conclude that an optimally fitness enhancing cognitive system is a 
rational cognitive system (ibid.). 
For anyone familiar with the complexities of evolution and the problems with classical 
Darwinism, some difficulties with such a will already become apparent. The most feasible 
way to defend such an evolutionary story would be to claim that a rational cognitive system 
can reliably produce true beliefs, whereas true beliefs themselves are fitness enhancing, and 
thus favored by natural selection. This view is more recently defended by Hilary Kornblith, 
according to whom ‘knowledge’ is properly understood as a natural kind – a capacity shared 
by all animals that embodies reliably produced true beliefs, which are instrumental in 
producing fitness enhancing behavior, and is brought about by the interplay of the 
informational requirements of the environment and Darwinian natural selection (Kornblith 
2002: 61-2). A question to ask at this point is whether nature actually cares about truth, which 
doesn’t seem to be the case. However, in order not to be dismissive, a more careful look into 
the matter is called for. 
To see whether reliable cognitive systems are fitness enhancing, it is useful to make a 
heuristic distinction between external and internal fitness. External fitness pertains to how a 
gene leads a system’s behavior in different environments and circumstances. Internal fitness 
concerns what goes on within, where a good genetic program will achieve its effects without 
making excessive demands on the memory, energy, and other resources of the organism. 
(Stich 1990: 60-1) How a less truth-reliable genetically coded cognitive system can still turn 
out to be more fitness enhancing, both internally and externally, and thus favored by natural 
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selection, can be shown by an example. Imagine two systems G1 and G2 so that G1 is the one 
more reliable in producing truths and avoiding falsehoods. If the higher reliability of G1 
comes at the cost of greater resource requirement or time consumption, the less reliable 
system G2 may easily turn out to be favored by natural selection when considering the 
reducing marginal utility of information (p. 61). The link between internal fitness and reliable 
cognitive systems is thus easily severed. For external fitness, it will be useful to make a 
further distinction between false positives and false negatives. In the example of poisonous 
foods, a cognitive system arriving at a false positive would categorize a non-poisonous food 
as poisonous. For false negatives, it’s the other way around – a poisonous food is inferred as 
non-poisonous. In terms of biological fitness, it’s the false negatives that are more costly – in 
an environment with other possible food sources, unnecessarily avoiding a falsely-inferred 
poisonous food has little consequence, whereas failing to avoid a falsely-inferred non-
poisonous food may mean illness or death. Thus a more fitness-enhancing system would be 
the one that’s more risk averse, despite arriving at less truths and more falsehoods. (pp. 60-3) 
Another hurdle for the evolutionary story is the question of whether evolution actually 
produces close approximations to optimally well-designed systems. This doesn’t seem to be 
the case for two reasons: (1) the varied causes for evolution, and (2) natural selection’s 
limited options (pp. 63-6). 
The first problem is underlined by the fact that evolution happens for a variety of other 
reasons than natural selection, namely mutation (natural selection doesn’t act upon mutations 
that are neither beneficial nor harmful), gene flow (i.e. migration), genetic drift (mainly in 
small populations) and non-random mating. As for natural selection’s options, it is highly 
implausible to assume that mutations coding for optimal design will generally be available. 
Stich names three considerations that make this apparent: (1) the fact that technologically 
improved organisms (those employing prosthetic limbs, for example) will far surpass those 
not-improved in terms of fitness, (2) the persistence of pleiotropic linking where one gene has 
a positive effect on one system and a negative one on another shows that optimal mutations 
that would either replace the gene for its negative effect or introduce another gene that would 
suppress the harmful effect, aren’t always readily available, and (3) the persistence of less-fit 
homozygous phenotypes in the population point to the fact that mutations offering an optimal 
phenotype in both heterozygous and homozygous forms aren’t available either. (pp. 63-6) 
Furthermore, even if genes producing optimal phenotypes were to be readily available, it is 
far from clear that this phenotype would spread throughout the population. In the case of 
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“cheating” genes, some genes in meiosis have the capacity to end up significantly 
overrepresented in sperm or eggs, and in a number of cases, cheating genes have been shown 
to produce harmful effects. (p. 66) Furthermore, Philip Kitcher has shown how natural 
selection can cause an optimally fit homozygous phenotype to disappear from the population 
(cf. Kitcher 1985: 215). The idea that natural selection must result in close approximations to 
optimally well-designed systems is therefore a highly dubious one. 
The very claim that inferential strategies are the result of evolution is itself also questionable. 
For the evolutionary story to be viable it must be shown that (1) populations exhibit some 
variation in inferential strategies of a sort that affects the reproductive success of organisms in 
a systematic way and (2) the variance must be either directly or indirectly under genetic 
control. Showing that these conditions actually obtain isn’t as trivial as some of the more 
naïve takes on biological evolution would imply. Consider, for example, a possibly parallel 
case of language. It is not obvious whether the capacity to speak some language is more 
fitness-enhancing than the capacity to speak another. Such capacities depend on the location 
of a person’s birth and their general life-choices, and furthermore, if some language is indeed 
more fitness-enhancing than another, then it does not follow that this language will become a 
dominant one, as languages are known to rise and decline due to factors other than biological. 
In the same line, some inferential systems may come to be the dominant ones due to extra-
biological reasons. To show that a dominant inferential system is optimal in promoting 
survival and reproductive success, we would need to know how such a system came to be the 
dominant one, to which end we don’t have nearly enough evidence. (Stich 1990: 67-70) 
In Kornblith’s view, the complexities of evolution don’t raise a serious problem for his 
naturalistic account of an animal’s cognitive capacities – that the capacity to reliably attain 
true beliefs has developed by natural selection. While he is certainly aware of the issues just 
raised, his account is simple and robust enough to not be seriously endangered by them. He 
presents two considerations for that. Firstly, cognitive capacities as explained by Kornblith 
are no different from other complex organs of an animal: just as lungs are best explained to 
have been selected for their role in introducing oxygen to the blood, so too are cognitive 
capacities selected for their role in meeting the informational demands of the environment 
(Kornblith 2002: 58-9). Secondly, that natural selection may easily favor a less truth-
conducive cognitive capacity, if it is more conducive to fitness, is a claim that proves far too 
much: a carnivore’s teeth are selected for their function of ripping flesh, and the shape of a 
panda’s thumb is selected for its ability to strip bamboo leaves from the stalk, but despite that, 
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the practice of carrying out those activities may at times conflict with the goal of survival 
(ibid.). It is worth noting here that Kornblith’s account isn’t specific to human knowledge: the 
evolutionarily developed capacity he talks about is common to all animals and doesn’t require 
human rationality, social practices, or reflection. The capacity he draws out functions quite 
well as a robust natural category, or a natural kind. However, the crutch of his view seems to 
be its appeal to truth – that the naturally selected and fitness-enhancing cognitive systems are 
also truth-conducive. This is not something to simply overlook, as Kornblith is quite 
concerned about the common criticism towards naturalized epistemology – that it strips 
epistemology of its normative dimension (p. 137). For him, the normativity of his take on 
epistemology is saved by the fact that when it comes to evaluating various cognitive systems, 
their truth-conduciveness always plays a pre-eminent role, so that epistemic norms function as 
universal hypothetical imperatives (pp. 157-9). 
What to take out of this chapter is that “bad reasoning” is possible both conceptually and 
biologically, and an instance of “bad reasoning” is typically understood as one that diverges 
significantly from our normal reasoning. This is where the normative dimension of 
epistemology becomes central. It must be shown why our normatively sanctioned strategies of 
reasoning are preferable to others. A common answer is that they are more conducive to truth. 
However, before turning to that issue, I will set out some general problems with analytic 
epistemology. These are problems that Kornblith also takes issue with, although it can be 
shown that the normative side of his theory fails to overcome them. 
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2. Evaluative-Concept Pluralism and its Bearing on “Analytic Epistemology” 
I borrow the term ‘analytic epistemology’ from Stich and use it to refer to any epistemological 
project which is guided by the method of conceptual analysis, such that it develops its theories 
by analyzing and explicating our epistemic concepts by comparing them with our relevant 
commonsense intuitions. Now, evaluative-concept pluralism is the empirically supported 
thesis that different people invoke different epistemic concepts and judgments when 
evaluating cognition. If these differences are significant and systematic, then there is reason to 
believe that the project of analytic epistemology is methodologically flawed, because if 
different groups of people intuitively employ concepts and judgments that diverge from those 
of an idiosyncratic group of professional academic philosophers, then it is not so obvious that 
we should favor the latter ones. The twofold nature of conceptual analysis reveals a twofold 
problem with analytic epistemology. First, it is focused on the concepts of various epistemic 
phenomena, rather than what underlies said concepts. Second, it draws upon pre-theoretic 
epistemic intuitions which aren’t necessarily trustworthy or uniform throughout the 
population. 
2.1 Conceptual analysis 
The first charge is one that can be found in various projects of naturalized epistemology. 
Kornblith’s account of knowledge as a natural kind is based on the idea that the subject matter 
of epistemology should be knowledge itself, not our concept of knowledge (Kornblith 2002: 
1). How one is to disentangle the concept from its underlying phenomenon is a matter more 
complicated, but in the naturalist view, the general idea is to endeavor for a more scientific 
approach. However, whether epistemology should constitute a subchapter of psychology (e.g., 
Quine 1969), or merely live up to the empirical standards of special sciences (e.g., Kitcher 
1992), the concern raised is that our epistemic concepts as conceived may be inadequate in 
capturing the actual workings of cognition. An objection raised in favor of conceptual 
analysis might be that the epistemic concepts evoked in traditional epistemology reflect the 
intuitive categories and judgments we have pertaining to matters epistemic – whether 
‘knowledge’, ‘justification’ or other concepts can ever find grounding in an extra-
epistemological world is beside the point, for these are simply the very categories we use in 
carving our world through an epistemic lens. This brings to the second concern with analytic 
epistemology – its reliance on idiosyncratic epistemic intuitions. 
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2.2 Epistemic intuitions 
What exactly differentiates intuition from other epistemic faculties is a question not easily 
answered. Some replies include the notions that intuitions are simply a certain kind of belief 
(e.g., Lewis 1983: p.x), that they are dispositions to believe (e.g., Inwagen 1997: 309), that 
they are sui generis occurrent propositional attitudes wholly separate from beliefs (e.g., Bealer 
1998), or those that deny intuitions of having propositional content at all (Pust 2012 considers 
this possibility, without adhering to it himself). Despite this colorful picture, intuitions are 
routinely used as a methodological device in analytic epistemology, where the project of 
comparing certain epistemic concepts with one’s intuitions is seen as a wholly uncontroversial 
one. However, the findings of evaluative concept pluralism point to the fact that the intuitions 
commonly employed in epistemology are largely idiosyncratic. 
I won’t argue that intuitions have no value, or that they haven’t played a substantial role in 
building up some of the most influential theories in epistemology. This could be accounted for 
by the fact that our intuitions provide a relatively reliable way to work out the rough early 
details of a theory that tries to capture a part of our immediate world. In this case, our 
cognition in the way it is presented to us here in our culture. However, following Kornblith, I 
would question the relevance of such intuitions when faced with more complex contemporary 
theories (cf. Kornblith 2002: 8-20). I would argue that one should take a critical look on what 
those intuitions might actually be – not a well of unchangeable evidential data, but something 
much more malleable and shaped by a person’s life-experience (or by their genetic buildup, 
which would be considerably harder to defend). This is suggested by empirical findings that 
show people to invoke different epistemic concepts and judgments when making evaluations 
about the various hypothetical scenarios routinely employed by epistemologists (Gettier cases, 
Knobe-effect cases, etc.). Divergence of intuitive judgments have been recorded between 
Westerners and East Asians (Weinberg et al. 2001: 443), people of low and high 
socioeconomic status (ibid., 447-8), students who have taken no philosophy courses and those 
who have taken two or more (Nichols et al. 2003: 232), men and women (Buckwalter and 
Stich 2010), philosophers and non-philosophers (Knobe 2003a). 
The last mentioned point of divergence is also implicit in routine philosophical practice –
when professional philosophers solicit epistemic intuitions from the beginners in their 
courses, they are quick to dismiss the intuitions that don’t fit the accepted central principles of 
current epistemology (Nagel 2007: 805). So when a beginner contends that in some cases 
knowledge can be false, they are invoking the wrong concept of knowledge. For Kornblith, 
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this is an indication that the various folk-psychological conceptions of phenomena like 
‘knowledge’ don’t exhibit a necessary-and-sufficient conditions unity that knowledge itself 
(as a natural kind) might require (ibid.). That philosophers favor their own educated intuitions 
is, however, indicative of a kind of theory-contamination among philosophers already 
committed to some epistemological theory (Goldman and Pust 1993: 183). For this, Goldman 
and Pust call for favoring folk intuitions, while Kornblith suggests writing off intuitions as a 
historical chapter in the early days of a working theory. Goldman and Pust must then deal 
directly with the problems stemming from the evidence of evaluative-concept pluralism, 
whereas a naturalist view like Kornblith’s must come up with an all-encompassing theory of 
knowledge wholly independent of both our intuitions, and those that diverge, while 
overcoming the hurdles brought up in Chapter 1. 
2.3 The task of epistemology 
One common objection to the kind of criticism just raised is that for an epistemological theory 
to be correct, it must leave our epistemic situation largely unchanged, so a theory which 
accurately captures our reflective epistemic judgments is better than one that does not (Bishop 
2009: 118). In other words, the fact that analytic epistemologists work with the idiosyncratic 
intuitions that they share among themselves, is not a problem, as whatever is picked out by 
their intuitive concepts is just that which they are interested in. The fact that our epistemic 
vocabulary picks out different concepts in different cultures (or in other groups not properly 
trained in our terminology), is unproblematic as these other concepts aren’t part of our 
epistemological agenda. This naturally raises the question of what is the task of epistemology, 
properly understood. 
A prominent defender of analytic epistemology, Ernest Sosa, questions the findings of 
evaluative-concept pluralism on four accounts: (1) it is unclear what the subjects questioned 
actually disagree on, (2) the choices offered to the subjects might be too limited, (3) the 
concepts of ‘knowledge’ and ‘justification’ and so forth might simply refer to different 
commodities in different cultures, none of them exclusively valuable, and (4) epistemology is 
not properly understood in lines of it making normative verdicts (Sosa 2009: 107-10). 
The first two points, while possibly valid, call for further empirical research that doesn’t 
already assume cognitive monism. The latter two are specific to Sosa’s understanding of what 
epistemology should be about, a view not shared by all, and not all that easy to defend. For 
Stich, the idea that divergence in epistemic intuitions can be accounted for by the fact that the 
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epistemic concepts used in different cultures simply refer to different commodities, is not 
satisfying when one is in the business of evaluating and improving human cognition. When 
faced with universal claims of the kind ‘if S’s belief that p is an instance of knowledge, then, 
ceteris paribus, S ought to believe that p’, then why should we favor the notion of 
‘knowledge’ of high SES white Western males over any conflicting ones (Stich 2009: 234)? 
For Sosa, this is a nonstarter, as valuing one notion does not devaluate the rest – one can value 
different senses of ‘knowledge’ just as one may value owning both money banks and river 
banks (Sosa 2009: 109). For Sosa then, there is no conflict. However, this kind of pluralism is 
difficult to maintain. Consider a parallel: if a Yanomamö intuitively judges that it is morally 
permissible to kill the men of another tribe and rape their women, and for me it is not, then we 
are invoking different concepts of moral permissibility, and it would be no easy task to show 
how the “commodities” invoked by our diverging notions are equally valuable (Stich 2009: 
235). If we are interested in improving human cognition, then the cognitive categories that 
constitute the cognitive world of people in other cultures also call for careful studying. Also, 
there may be cases where a person values both the commodity of knowledge and some other 
commodity that’s picked out by ‘knowledge’ in another culture, but not being able to have 
both, must choose which is more valuable. Stich’s contention is that the kind of epistemology 
favored by Sosa is that of ethno-epistemology, where the epistemologist is concerned with 
describing a singular idiosyncratic account of knowledge, and at that, it fails to live up to the 
empirical standards of ethnography (p. 236). If, however, one wishes to come up with a theory 
of knowledge that is more than the explication of how they are used to employing their 
concept of ‘knowledge’, they should either do away with intuitions at this stage (e.g., Korblith 
2002) or show why the intuitions as favored by their community cut closer to what constitutes 
knowledge, which would be no easy task. 
Kornblith’s naturalized account of epistemology seeks to overcome these limitations of 
conceptual analysis and analytic epistemology, and seems to mostly succeed. Study of 
concepts is exchanged for the study of actual knowledge. Pre-theoretic intuitions are 
understood as something of value only in the early stages of an investigation, which should at 
this stage, when we are studying knowledge as a proper natural kind, not be looked back to 
for verification. However, Kornblith’s robust take on epistemology seems to fall apart in its 
proposed normative dimension, where truth is placed center-stage in all cognitive evaluation. 
To see why this is the case, a careful look into the proposed value of truth in our cognition is 
necessary.  
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3. The Normative Function of Truth in Epistemology 
In assessing whether a cognitive mechanism is a good one, the central criterion is generally 
thought to be its truth-conduciveness. Other important aspects may concern its effectiveness 
in terms of time and energy, accessibility to the agent, internal consistency, and so on, but 
only insofar as they pertain to the central aim of attaining true beliefs. Why we should look at 
a cognitive mechanism’s truth-conduciveness in order to properly evaluate it, is explained by 
the assertion that true beliefs are simply valuable to have. Even if they might lack intrinsic 
value, then they are at least instrumentally valuable. This is an assertion that Stich explicitly 
argues against – in his view, true beliefs are neither intrinsically nor instrumentally all that 
valuable to have. In the following I will first sketch Stich’s argument against the value of truth 
when it comes to the assessment of various cognitive mechanisms. Then I will look at 
Kornblith’s arguments against Stich’s view, and show them to be unsuccessful in establishing 
the normativity of truth in cognition. 
3.1 On the value of truth 
For Stich, one of the underlying causes for the prima facie understanding of truth as 
something valuable to have, is a cluster of philosophical metaphors that have long ago 
become part of the fabric of commonsense wisdom. These metaphors liken beliefs to pictures 
or maps by which we steer in our world, and it is the veridical pictures and the accurate maps, 
i.e. those standing for true beliefs, that allow us to steer well. That these are simply metaphors 
is clear when one considers a belief like ‘I believe that there are exactly four prime numbers 
between ten and twenty’. First, it is not clear how one is to picture such a belief in any way 
that corresponds to a picture or a map. Second, if one is a materialist, then they’d be hard-
pressed to find the belief-pictures corresponding to various beliefs in the brain, which would 
be necessary to show the metaphor to be more than just that. (Stich 1990: 101-3) 
A second issue concerns the nature of beliefs and what it is for them to be true. This problem 
is considerably more complicated, for both of these questions are greatly disputed and subject 
to radically different answers. Stich’s approach is to first tackle one of the more plausible 
accounts – what he calls the causal/functional theory, before generalizing his criticism to 
other feasible views. 
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3.1.1 Causal/functional theory of the semantic properties of mental states 
The causal/functional theory that Stich uses as a backdrop for his arguments assumes that (1) 
beliefs are real psychological states, and that (2) each instance, or token, of a belief is 
identical with some neurophysiological state, whereas the same belief type in different 
individuals isn’t necessarily identical with the same neurophysiological state type. A peculiar 
property of beliefs is that unlike most other brain states, they are either true or false. This is 
explained by introducing some interpretation function which maps certain brain-state tokens 
onto semantic entities like propositions, content sentences, or specifications of truth 
conditions. A belief is thus true if and only if the proposition it is mapped to is true, or if and 
only if its truth conditions are obtained, and so on. (Stich 1990: 103-5) This requires that we 
define some interpretation function which maps mental states to things with semantic 
properties. 
The first theoretical background for the causal/functional theory is Tarski’s theory of truth. In 
Tarski’s view, an axiomatic theory of language must specify a truth condition for each of the 
infinitely many well-formed sentences of the language. This is done by forming a meta-
language sentence which specifies the conditions under which an object-language sentence of 
a certain structure is true. This approach has two limitations. First, there lacks a well 
motivated general account of what it is for a specification of truth conditions to be adequate or 
acceptable. Second, Tarski doesn’t tell us enough about how to properly form the list of 
axioms, or base clauses of a recursive truth definition, which would specify the semantic 
properties of the language’s non-compound predicates and names. (pp. 106-8) 
This is where the Putnam-Kripke causal theory of reference comes into play. The causal 
theory provides us with a general account of what it is for an arbitrary name or predicate in an 
arbitrary language to refer to a particular object or a particular class of objects. In general, a 
name denotes an individual if and only if an appropriate causal-historical chain extends from 
the first use, or baptism, of the name, to its current use. The same story also applies to natural 
kind predicates. Since there are endless varieties of causal chains in the world linking all 
kinds of events in all kinds of ways, the relevant kind of causal chains are taken to be those 
that are compatible with our intuitions. If some proposed causal chain links our utterances to 
people or objects that intuition insists we are not talking about, then such a causal story is 
seen as defective. Furthermore, that the causal theory cuts closer to our intuitive 
understanding of reference is also generally seen as an advantage of such a theory over 
descriptive theories of reference. (pp. 108-9) 
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The last piece of the causal/functional theory must take it from an account of how sentences 
in a natural language get their truth conditions, to a semantic theory of mental states. For this, 
beliefs are seen as complex psychological states which, akin to sentences, can be viewed as 
built up out of simpler components. This allows us to associate belief tokens with well-formed 
formulas in some uninterpreted formal language, or as neurally-encoded inscriptions of the 
relevant well-formed formulas. Truth conditions for these inscriptions are specified by 
identifying certain of the words they are built up from as names or predicates, and the rest as 
connectives or quantifiers open to a Tarski-style theory of truth. Names and predicates are 
then paired with appropriate denotation or extension by tracing their causal ancestry, while 
connectives and quantifiers get their pairing from the pattern of interactions between names 
and predicates that they manifest. (pp. 109-10) 
3.1.2 The limits and idiosyncrasies of the interpretation function 
The problem of the value of true beliefs is properly understood as something that turns on the 
interpretation function by which certain brain-states are mapped onto propositions, conditions 
of the world, or other such concepts. One feasible account on what such an interpretation 
function should look like can be found in the previously sketched causal/functional theory of 
reference. However, by drawing out the problems with such an account, the purported value 
of true beliefs can be show to be not as obvious as commonly thought of. These problems are 
the limitedness and the idiosyncrasy of any such interpretation function. 
That the interpretation function favored by the causal/functional theory is limited in its 
domain is due to two reasons. The first reason relates to the causal theory of reference, while 
the second one turns on the functional story about logical form. On the causal side, any 
account that even roughly fits commonsense intuition will only specify a limited domain of 
reference-fixing chains out of the empirically possible causal histories of mental words. 
Because of this, there will be many mental words that can end up in a speaker’s mental 
lexicon that aren’t tied to the world in the special way that the causal theory of reference 
requires. (Stich 1990: 110-11) For example, if the word ‘Aristotle’ enters my mental lexicon 
by me falsely overhearing a conversation about turtles, then by the causal account, my 
uttering of ‘Aristotle’ won’t refer to anything, because, by common sense, this is not a proper 
way to be introduced to the name ‘Aristotle’. Any mental sentences in which mental words 
like this occur in won’t be paired with any appropriate truth conditions. As for limitedness 
stemming from the functional account of logical form, the issue lies with the fact that there 
are endlessly many syntactic structures for which there are no adequate truth theoretic 
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recursive clauses. Since an account of the required interpretation function is an explication of 
our intuitive judgments about contents or truth conditions, any structure that doesn’t have an 
intuitively natural semantic interpretation will be left out of its domain. For example, a mental 
sentence is properly interpreted as a conjunction, or a counterfactual or any other logical 
construction when it interacts with other mental sentences in ways that mirror what logic 
intuitively permits. However, one can formally characterize an indefinite number of patterns 
of interaction among sentences or well-formed formulas that have no intuitively plausible 
semantics. (pp. 111-13) 
The causal/functional interpretation function is also idiosyncratic. Even within the domain 
where it specifies interpretations, there can be lots of other functions that map mental states to 
the world in ways that aren’t sanctioned by commonsense intuition. Let’s look at the causal 
theory of reference. On the one hand, it specifies how a new name or a predicate is introduced 
into a language by the process of fixing its reference, or grounding it, to an object or class of 
objects. On the other, it specifies the process of social transmission whereby the name or 
predicate is passed from one speaker to another, while maintaining its original reference. In 
both instances, the legitimate groundings and transmissions are once again those that accord 
with intuition. However, both names and predicates get their groundings in markedly different 
ways: a baptismal process of a baby is quite unlike that of naming a war, and how the 
predicate ‘gold’ came to be paired with its extension is probably very different from how it 
was with ‘kangaroo’. Similar diversity manifests in the processes of reference-preserving-
transmissions. What ties all the acceptable causal chains together from grounding to 
transmission isn’t some substantive property they all share, but rather that commonsense 
intuition counts them all as reference-fixing chains. The causal/functional theory is thus well 
suited for explicating the pre-theoretic views we have on how the words in a mental language 
are related to what they designate. However, it fails to capture the endless multitude of 
alternative views, some of which depart from commonsense in minor ways, and some in 
major. (pp. 114-15) 
These alternative causal chains will link some or many mental words to objects or extensions 
different from those ascribed by commonsense intuition. Thus, they will characterize 
alternative notions of “reference”, which we may call REFERENCE*, REFERENCE**, and 
so on. Now let’s say that the name ‘Jonah’ in the Bible refers to a real, historical person about 
whom mythical tales were told as historical facts were forgotten. If we were to modify the 
intuitively sanctioned notion of reference by forming a kind of a hybrid between the causal 
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theory and descriptive theories, we could end up with the notion of REFERENCE*, which is a 
word-world relation just like reference, except that it also requires that if the majority of the 
nontrivial descriptions a speaker associates with the name actually apply to no one, then the 
name is empty. In such a case, if there actually was a historical person about whom grand 
tales of surviving in the belly of a whale gradually developed, then ‘Jonah’ will refer to that 
person, whereas it will REFER* to no one. Furthermore, by giving descriptions a somewhat 
different role in determining the reference of proper names, ‘Jonah’ might end up 
REFERRING** to some long-forgotten ancient who actually did survive three days in the 
belly of a whale. Also, a notion of REFERENCE*** could be designed so that ‘water’ 
includes in its extension not just H2O, but also the watery stuff XYZ. While these alternatives 
turn on the grounding of a word, a different kind of alternatives can also be produced by 
varying the allowable reference-preserving patterns of social transmission. (pp. 115-16) 
Each of the alternative word-world relations provides an alternative set of base clauses on 
which we can build alternative interpretation functions not favored by commonsense intuition. 
While according to the intuitively sanctioned account a belief ‘Jonah was a Moabite’ is 
properly mapped to a proposition that is true if and only if the historical person behind the 
legends was a Moabite. However, an interpretation function based on the REFERENCE** 
relation would map the same belief to a proposition that is true if and only if a certain long-
forgotten ancient who survived in the belly of the whale for three days was a Moabite. An 
intuitive interpretation would map the belief ‘there is no water on the sun’ to the proposition 
that there is no H2O on the sun, while one based on REFERENCE*** would map it to the 
proposition that there is no H2O or XYZ on the sun. (p. 116) 
Now there is no reason to believe that the intuitive judgments underlying the standard 
readings of reference are in any way innate. The many findings of evaluative-concept 
pluralism point to the opposite – if there are significant and systematic differences in the 
intuitive concepts and judgments that people invoke in evaluating cognition then there is 
reason to believe that intuitions also diverge on other accounts. Perhaps the most poignant 
example here is the divergence in intuitively acceptable accounts of reference between 
Westerners and East Asians, recorded by Machery and colleagues, which shows that in 
Kripke’s Gödel case (where Gödel actually stole the famous incompleteness theorem from his 
friend Schmidt) Westerners were more likely to favor the causal theory for grounding the 
reference of ‘Gödel’, while East Asians were more in favor of the descriptive theory 
(Machery et al. 2004). Interestingly, the same result wasn’t found in the Jonah case, but this 
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could easily be due to reasons not pertaining directly to the intuitive judgments of the causal 
or descriptive models of reference – that East Asians did not favor the descriptive story of 
reference in fixing reference for ‘Jonah’ could be because according to the descriptive 
account, ‘Jonah’ will end up referring to no one, which could be seen as something to avoid 
for pragmatic reasons (ibid.). 
For natural kind terms, the picture is even more colorful. Consider, for example, the New 
Guinean language Kâte. In this language there’s a word ‘bilin’, which denotes a certain kind 
of grass with strong roots which are said to hold the earth together during earthquakes. Now, 
when nails were first introduced to the native speakers of this language, the natives applied 
the same word to them – as well as to wire, iron rods, and everything else that served the 
purpose of holding things together. (Cassirer 1953: 41) Also consider the findings which 
show that while Westerners are likely to rely on rules of similarity relations in reasoning and 
categorization, the Chinese are more likely to group together objects for functional (e.g., 
pencil-notebook) or contextual (e.g., sky-sunshine) considerations, and Russians have been 
found to have a strong tendency to group together objects for their practical function (Henrich 
et al. 2010: 72). It is reasonable to assume that the idiosyncratic reliance on similarity 
relations for reasoning and categorization among Westerners has had a strong bearing on the 
development of what we call natural kind terms, some of which may not be as intuitively 
acceptable to people from other cultures. Furthermore, it is very likely that the intuitions 
sanctioning our acceptable causal chains of reference could be changed, and at that they could 
be changed for the better, as there is no reason to maintain that any alternative accounts of 
REFERENCE*, or REFERENCE**, and so on are in any way seriously flawed or less 
preferable. The regular, commonsense interpretation function stands out from the alternatives 
only by virtue of it being favored by local, contemporary intuition, while what actually 
constitutes that intuition, as well as what underlying psychological mechanisms give rise to it, 
is something we know very little about. 
3.1.3 The value of true beliefs 
When it comes to deciding what we really value in our doxastic states, truth has a lot of 
competition. As noted, while an intuitively sanctioned account of the interpretation function 
might specify that a certain belief token is true if and only if there is no H2O on the sun, an 
alternative account based on REFERENCE*** would specify that the same belief token is 
true (or TRUE***) if and only if there is no H20 or XYZ on the sun. Any given set of belief 
tokens one might have will then contain a certain percentage n of true beliefs. It will also 
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contain a certain percentage n* of TRUE* beliefs, a percentage n** of TRUE** beliefs, and 
so on. It will often be the case that by increasing our percentage of true beliefs, we will 
decrease our percentage of TRUE* and TRUE** beliefs. A question that presents itself at this 
point is that by valuing true beliefs, are we ready to give up TRUTH* or TRUTH**. (Stich 
1990: 117-18) 
True beliefs can be taken to be valuable either intrinsically or instrumentally. An intrinsically 
valuable commodity is good to have for its own sake, while an instrumentally valuable 
commodity is useful in order to achieve some other ends – which may themselves be of either 
intrinsic or instrumental value. Thus, if a person genuinely holds true beliefs to be 
intrinsically valuable, then little can be done (or should be done) to dissuade them from that. 
The best one can do is to show what those true beliefs actually are and what intrinsically 
valuing them entails. As for the instrumental value of true beliefs, it can be shown that they 
are not all that valuable when it comes to achieving other desired ends – alternatives could 
well be a lot more conducive in that regard. 
Intrinsically valuing true beliefs can be shown to be a profoundly conservative thing to do for 
two reasons. Namely, that the intuitively sanctioned interpretation function which pairs beliefs 
with their truth conditions is both partial and idiosyncratic. The limited domain of the 
interpretation function entails that there will be a vast set of possible cognitive systems which 
admit to no semantic evaluation. In that domain there is neither truth nor falsity, and one 
placing intrinsic value on true beliefs may thus resist even considering, not to mention 
adopting, such systems, because they know in advance that these systems can’t arrive at true 
beliefs. For them, the end products of cognition must be semantically interpretable, and to be 
semantically interpretable is to not depart too radically from current patterns of reasoning or 
from familiar ways of causally tying mental states to the world. However, something to 
consider here is that while likely much of the semantically uninterpretable domain is useless, 
or chaotic, it may very well contain systems that are highly conducive to happiness, biological 
fitness, or other desirable ends. (pp. 118-19) 
Conservatism stemming from the idiosyncratic nature of the interpretation function is due to it 
relying on commonsense intuition. The causal/functional interpretation function singles out 
certain truth conditions from TRUTH* CONDITIONS, TRUTH** CONDITIONS, and other 
variations by looking at what the intuitively sanctioned causal chains of reference allow. Such 
an interpretation function is in no way a simple one – the vast variety of groundings and 
reference-preserving transmissions aren’t unified by sharing some substantive property, but 
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simply by the fact that they accord with commonsense intuitions. However, those very 
intuitions are subject to change – they are likely culturally transmitted and acquired from the 
surrounding society. By intrinsically valuing true beliefs one is simply accepting the 
interpretation function that our culture has bequeathed to us and letting that function 
determine their basic epistemic value. (pp. 119-20)  Furthermore, even if our intuitions were 
somehow genetically determined, then intrinsically valuing true beliefs would amount to 
simply accepting that which biology has ordained – and it is not clear why we should allow 
that. 
To say that true beliefs are instrumentally valuable is to say that having them can lead to 
something else that is valued. Since the scope of all things that people may value is likely an 
endless one, showing that true beliefs have no instrumental value would be no easy task. 
However, what can be show is that the instrumental value of true beliefs isn’t as obvious as 
generally thought. In assessing whether something is instrumentally valuable, it should be 
specified what it is evaluated against. If two different commodities are both conducive to 
attaining some other end, then the one more conducive to it, all things considered, will be the 
one favored. Therefore, to maintain that true beliefs are of great instrumental value, it isn’t 
enough to simply show that they are more conducive to attaining desired ends than, say, false 
beliefs. While it may be that in many cases true beliefs are much more preferable to false ones 
(which is itself hardly a trivial claim), this says nothing for TRUE*, or TRUE** beliefs, or for 
any other categories of belief that are simply picked out by an interpretation function not 
sanctioned by intuition and tradition. It won’t always be the case that TRUE**...* beliefs 
which aren’t true will be false. Some mental states to which TRUTH**...* conditions are 
assigned may have no truth conditions at all – they are neither true nor false, while possibly 
being more conducive to attaining a desired goal than regular old true beliefs. (pp. 121-2) 
At this point it could be argued that our current intuitive theory of interpretation is the result 
of a long evolutionary process through which many alternative mappings from mental states 
to propositions have been rejected, and the one we’ve ended up with presumably does a very 
good job of fostering survival and success. However, as noted in 1.1.2, neither biological nor 
social evolution can be relied upon to produce the best of all possible options, or even one that 
is close to the best. Furthermore, even if using the intuitively sanctioned interpretation 
function were to be especially conducive to survival, this wouldn’t entail that having true 
beliefs is more instrumentally valuable than having TRUE**...* beliefs. It would also have to 
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be shown that the intuitively sanctioned interpretation function is conducive to survival 
because it fosters believing the truth. (pp. 122) 
A final consideration against the great instrumental value of true beliefs is the fact that in 
many cases we already know that having true beliefs is not the best way to achieve our more 
fundamental goals. (pp. 122-3) If my true belief about the time of departure of my plane leads 
me to get on the plane on time and it happens to crash, then having had a false belief in its 
stead would have been more conducive to my survival. The same is also true for a multitude 
of cases where having false beliefs is more optimal in the pursuit of happiness, or pleasure, or 
self-fulfillment, or other commodities I might value. For all these cases, alternative belief-to-
world mappings that foster me with TRUE**...* beliefs could well be favorable to those that 
get at regular, intuitively-arrived-at truths. 
While Stich assumed that the causal/functional account of the interpretation function is on the 
right track, his criticism of the value of truth easily carries over to other plausible accounts. 
Whatever interpretation function one comes up with, showing that true beliefs are of great 
instrumental value will still require that they’d be shown to be more conducive to our goals 
than TRUE**...* beliefs. And given any plausible account of the interpretation function, there 
will be instances of alternative cognitive mechanisms that this function does not cover, and 
favoring it will still end up amounting to unnecessary conservatism. Also, if we were 
presented with a more theoretically elegant and less messy account of the interpretation 
function than the causal/functional one, there’s nothing to say that the people adhering to the 
messier account won’t lead happier, healthier and more rewarding lives than those whose 
cognitive systems tend to produce true beliefs. (pp. 124-7) 
3.2 Is truth a pre-eminent epistemic value? 
By showing that the value of true beliefs is far from obvious, Stich proposes that in order to 
evaluate one system of cognitive mechanisms as preferable to another, we should consider if 
by using it we are more likely to achieve those things that we intrinsically value (Stich 1990: 
24). More pointedly, the system to be preferred is the one that would be most likely to achieve 
those things that are intrinsically valued by the person whose interests are relevant to the 
purposes of the evaluation. The person relevant will most of the time be the one who might be 
using the system. (pp. 131-2) Interestingly, this pragmatic account of cognitive evaluation is 
challenged by Kornblith on the grounds that it fails precisely where a pragmatic account 
should be the strongest – in allowing us to act so as to serve whatever interests we may care 
Vaus, The Normativity of Truth in Cognitive Evaluation 
25 
 
about (Kornblith: 2002: 156). For Kornblith, truth always plays a pre-eminent role in 
cognitive evaluation, regardless of what the people employing those systems are trying to 
achieve. In his view, whatever cognitive system one is to adopt, it is central that the chosen 
system will actually, in truth, get them to whatever it is they are trying to achieve. In a way, 
valuing the truth-conduciveness of our cognitive mechanisms is, for him, pragmatically 
preferable to denying this pre-eminent role played by truth. 
3.2.1 Cognitive evaluation vs. epistemic evaluation  
Kornblith contends that Stich’s view seems to lead to a strange situation where a person’s 
judgment of a belief as being unjustified provides a conclusive reason for rejecting it. This is 
because on Stich’s view epistemic evaluation already takes account of everything an agent 
values, so a judgment that a belief is epistemically unacceptable is no different from the 
judgment that all things considered, it is unacceptable. (Kornblith 2002: 151) This reading 
misses the point for two reasons. First, it assumes that to deem a belief as unjustified is 
something of a trivial task. In Stich’s scheme, it is clearly not. Stich’s account is highly 
relativistic, taking in account the agent of cognition, her context, and what she intrinsically 
values. To take in one glance all these relevant details is beyond our cognitive capacities, so 
no conclusive verdict on the justification of a given belief is likely even possible. Kornblith 
takes Stich’s relativistic and context-sensitive strategy of cognitive evaluation and turns it on 
its head by assuming that the evaluator has actual access to the whole story. However, let’s 
recall that Stich’s account is a pragmatic one, not one that sets constraints on the cognitive 
evaluations of omniscient beings. Moreover, Stich is in fact very careful with assigning 
judgments to instances of reasoning that may seem bad, or unjustified (cf. Stich 1990: 149-
58). A second problem with Kornblith’s contention is that, for Stich, there are no intrinsic 
epistemic virtues and thus no special cognitive or epistemic values, but just values as such 
(Bishop 2009: 120). That a belief is unjustified, on any account, might then mean nothing to 
the believer in case they simply place no value on justification. 
On the same theme, Kornblith criticizes Stich’s view for it raising epistemic evaluation to an 
all-encompassing status. If having a certain belief is epistemically ill-advised, then one might 
still have good reason, all things considered, to come to that belief. In Kornblith’s 
understanding, this is not sanctioned by Stich’s view. (Kornblith 2002: 151-2) This is clearly 
not the case: Kornblith assumes wrongly that cognitive evaluation for Stich means evaluation 
done in purely epistemic terms. What Stich is saying is quite the opposite: if having a certain 
belief is ill-advised for purely epistemic reasons as normally understood, like its lack of 
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justification, or it leading to falsehoods, while being conducive to that which the agent 
actually values, then for Stich, one should by all means retain that belief. In other words, 
Stich does not identify epistemic propriety with any proposed epistemic concepts. His account 
of cognitive evaluation easily sanctions evaluations done on moral, aesthetic, or any other 
grounds. 
Kornblith also raises the question of what exactly makes Stich’s account of epistemic 
evaluation epistemic (p. 152). Herein seems to lay the misconception Kornblith has about 
Stich’s account: properly understood it is in fact not an account of epistemic evaluation. It 
seeks to offer a strategy that’s good for evaluating cognitive states and processes in general. If 
such processes are at times best evaluated in terms other than purely epistemic, then 
evaluations from other perspectives are completely acceptable and even encouraged. Granted, 
this is a point of concern for Kornblith, as he points out that he is interested in finding out 
what room can be made for genuine epistemic evaluation. However, considering his 
contention that knowledge is a natural kind, this seems far too modest of him. If knowledge is 
truly a natural capacity shared by all animals that has developed by natural selection, and 
which produces fitness-enhancing behavior, then it is clearly not just the purely epistemic 
considerations of cognitive evaluation that we should be concerned with. 
First, we should consider what constitutes fitness-enhancing cognitive behavior. For 
Kornblith, the required fitness-enhancing behavior is that which stems from the animal 
attaining true beliefs about their environment, and a fitness enhancing cognitive mechanism is 
thus one that reliably produces true beliefs (given that it is capable of getting at such beliefs at 
a reasonably low cost of time and resources). As shown in 1.1.2, true beliefs are not always 
fitness-enhancing. Kornblith surely understands this, but in his mind they do a relatively good 
job at that, and in the end, truth-reliable cognitive mechanisms will still turn out to be more 
fitness-enhancing than those that get at substantially more false beliefs (pp. 63-7). However, 
as noted in 3.1.3, this is not enough to show that the naturally selected truth-reliable system is 
in any way the most fitness-enhancing of all possible systems. This is evident from the fact 
that natural selection cannot produce optimally (or even near optimally) well-designed 
systems. In order to establish that any naturally selected truth-reliable cognitive system is 
optimal to an animal’s fitness, it would also have to be shown that it is more fitness-enhancing 
than some alternative TRUTH*-reliable system. More fitness-enhancing alternatives to the 
regular truth-reliable systems can easily be constructed. Furthermore, since optimal 
phenotypes aren’t always readily available in the gene pool, the truth-reliable cognitive 
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system that we’ve ended up with is very likely not the most optimal to biological fitness, even 
if we suppose the regular notion of truth to be wholly unproblematic – given different 
circumstances we could have ended up with a system that more reliably gets at true (not 
TRUE*) beliefs. If it is the normativity of epistemology we are concerned with, i.e. if we are 
in the business of evaluating cognition and making prescriptions about which cognitive 
systems an agent should employ, then such alternatives (both the truth-reliable and TRUTH*-
reliable ones) shouldn’t be ignored. The strong link between truth and biological fitness that 
Kornblith argues for seems to be very fickle. This result is not surprising because, for one, 
nature doesn’t seem to care about truth, and furthermore, even if it were the case that truth-
reliable cognitive systems are generally fitness-enhancing, it’s far from clear that they are 
fitness-enhancing because they are truth-reliable. However, if the normative dimension of 
epistemology were to follow naturally from its descriptive dimension, which Kornblith thinks 
is the case (pp. 160-1), then the story about natural selection and biological fitness shouldn’t 
be simply set aside in favor of truth either, and if (one of the) relevant criteria for evaluating 
cognition is taken to be its conduciveness to biological fitness (which is not neatly linkable to 
truth-conduciveness), then such evaluation is clearly not subject to considerations purely 
epistemic. None of this goes to say that Kornblith’s account is, without a doubt, deeply off-
track, but it does suggest that he cannot so easily dismiss Stich’s view. 
The preceding assumes that biological fitness, or for that matter, natural selection, is a 
normatively relevant concern when it comes to cognitive evaluation. This is not quite 
obvious: even if natural selection could be shown to produce optimally fitness-enhancing 
cognitive systems, and even if such systems were fitness-enhancing because they are truth-
conducive, then this by its own will still fail to establish that such systems are normatively 
preferable. Kornblith himself notes that knowledge as conceived by him is conducive to 
fitness, and as such it is instrumental in producing the kind of behavior that satisfies a 
creature’s biological needs (p. 160). Now it is clear that we have needs other than biological, 
and it is also clear that for many of us a number of our biological needs are things that we 
would rather not fulfill. So even if truth-conduciveness were to be preeminent in evaluating 
whether a cognitive system is fitness-enhancing, there is no cause to extend this to all 
cognitive evaluation. In case the agent in question simply places no inherent value to 
biological fitness, it would still not be clear that all cognitive evaluation should turn on purely 
epistemic notions. 
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3.2.2 How a more truth-conducive cognitive system is worse for attaining the 
things that an agent values 
Kornblith also notes a deeper flaw in Stich’s account: namely that it fails when it comes to 
any actual cost-benefit calculation of one’s cognitive systems. A simple example of that 
would be the case where a person is deciding between two toasters in a store, where the 
toaster that has the highest expected value in terms of that which the person is trying to attain 
is the one that the person should buy. In doing this, the person makes use of some cognitive 
system. Now for Kornblith, such a system will always have to get at the truth of the matter. 
Imagine that all the person in question cares about is their happiness, and thus the best choice 
of a toaster would be the one that will ultimately make them happier. To know which of the 
toasters will lead to that, the cognitive system they employ will have to inform them about the 
actual consequences of choosing either of the toasters. In other words, the appropriate 
cognitive system will have to produce true beliefs about the consequences of either decision. 
(Kornblith 2002: 153-5) In Kornblith’s view, the system that produces more happiness-
conducive beliefs and less true ones will then fail to actually be conducive to a person’s 
happiness, as it will only tell the person what they would be happiest to believe that the 
consequences of their decisions are, and therefore fail to tell the person which decision would 
actually make them the happiest. (p. 155) A more successful system would be the one that 
reliably produces true beliefs about the happiness-conduciveness of their behavior, or rather, 
of their already held beliefs. 
Kornblith’s move from first-order beliefs to second-order, though not explicit, is quite 
noteworthy: it places the normative dimension of his view on beliefs about beliefs. While one 
may easily favor a cognitive system that leads them to attain the variety of things they value, 
they will also want to know if such a system will in truth get them there. This is why, for 
Kornblith, truth is pre-eminent in all cognitive evaluation. However, as a criticism of Stich, 
this is quite unfair. Before turning to the question of why this is so, I will first show how 
truth-conduciveness is not a necessary component of a successful cognitive system. For this, I 
will use Kornblith’s example of deciding between buying two toasters, but first I will 
introduce a pair of relevant psychological phenomena: confirmation bias and belief 
perseverance.  
Confirmation bias is a psychological phenomenon that causes a person to favor any 
information that confirms their beliefs or hypotheses (Plous 1993:233). This causes a person 
to both select their information in a way that reinforces their beliefs, and to interpret any 
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information pertaining to their beliefs in a biased way. Another phenomenon closely tied to it 
is belief perseverance, which is a tendency to cling to one’s initial beliefs even after receiving 
contradicting or disconfirming evidence against them (Anderson 2007: 109). Interestingly, 
this also seems to persist even if the disconfirming evidence is by all accounts completely 
acceptable to the person, and thus not filtered out by confirmation bias (cf. Ross et al. 1975: 
880-92). An example of how the named psychological phenomena may affect people’s 
decisions can be seen in how the serial positioning of objects affects the judgments of 
consumers. Nisbett and Wilson devised two experiments where they asked shopgoers to rate 
the quality of different articles of clothing (four nightgowns in the first experiment, and four 
identical nylon pantyhose in the other). In both experiments, the clothes were lined up from 
left to right, and in both experiments there was a pronounced position effect in people’s 
evaluations, such that the right-most garments were heavily preferred to the left-most 
garments. Upon questioning whether the positioning of the clothes had any effect on their 
choice, nearly all subjects denied and even vehemently rejected such an influence. (Nisbett 
and Ross 1980: 207) 
Now let’s consider how these psychological tendencies might bear on my decision of which 
toaster to buy, and how a happiness-conducive cognitive system will do a better job of leading 
me to happiness than a truth-conducive (or a happiness-and-truth-conducive) one. Suppose 
that I have some pretty specific criteria for the technical details that I want my toaster to have. 
Suppose further that I am on a limited budget, while this is a sad fact that I would rather not 
be reminded of. Suppose also that all I really value is my happiness, but that I am also a 
critically-minded person and easily swayed by scientific truths about human psychology. For 
the last assumption, let’s say that I have read about the serial positioning effect. I am 
presented with two toasters and the one on the left matches closer with my technical criteria. 
However, the one on the right is considerably cheaper, and due to the positioning effect, there 
is something inexplicably charming about it. Since the cognitive system I’m employing is not 
very truth-conducive, I will fail to realize that I am under the influence of this effect. Being 
also on a limited budget, I will subsequently distort and reinterpret the technical data of each 
and happily buy the cheaper one. Once home, I will also reinforce my belief that it was the 
right decision by reading favorable reviews of my new toaster (while ignoring unfavorable 
ones), and since I bought the cheaper one, I will have money left to buy quality bread to use 
with it. Had I employed a more truth-conducive cognitive system, I would have 
acknowledged that I am influenced by the positioning effect, and I would have stopped myself 
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from committing to confirmation bias. I wouldn’t have been as happy with my cheaper 
toaster, because I’d have been painfully aware that it didn’t match my technical criteria. 
Neither would I have been as happy with the more expensive one – I would be saddened by 
the fact that I couldn’t find a perfect toaster that also meets my budget. In both cases I would 
have had to face the sad truth that I simply can’t comfortably afford a good toaster. If all I 
value is my happiness, it’s difficult to see why the more truth-conducive cognitive system 
would be preferable to me. 
3.2.3 The pre-eminence of truth in second-order beliefs 
The pre-eminent normative role of truth in cognitive evaluation, according to Kornblith’s 
account, seems to manifest in second-order beliefs. That is, beliefs about beliefs. For any 
cognitive system designed to produce in an agent beliefs that are conducive to attaining their 
various goals, we want to know whether the beliefs therein produced are actually conducive 
to those goals. Therefore, the cognitive system we employ to evaluate various cognitive 
systems, will itself have to produce true beliefs about the systems under evaluation. A way to 
explain this better is to adopt the perspective of a third-person evaluator looking at my 
cognition in the toaster example. From this perspective, it will be clear that the less truth-
conducive cognitive system was indeed preferable to me for attaining happiness. However, 
this third-person evaluation is done in terms of truth. In evaluating what kind of a cognitive 
strategy best suits my desires, the evaluator will have to attain true beliefs about my cognition, 
about what I value, and the situation. If the third-person evaluator was herself using some 
non-truth-conducive cognitive system that doesn’t truthfully capture all the details relevant to 
the story, then the cognitive system she would recommend to me, might not actually lead me 
to happiness. 
If this is indeed Kornblith’s criticism of Stich’s view, which it seems to be, then it is quite 
unfair. At no point has Stich commended, that we, as epistemologists, should forgo our 
pursuit of knowledge on matters epistemic and collectively employ some alternative cognitive 
systems which will instead make us feel happy about whatever we are doing. Stich’s account 
of cognitive evaluation is very clear about its contingent character, and very careful about 
understanding the agent, their intrinsic values, and the context of evaluation. In every step of 
this, it is necessary to draw valid inferences about the relevant data, and in doing that, we of 
course appeal to some notion of truth. However, this does not establish that truth is a pre-
eminent normative value in all cognition. Cognitive systems are still properly evaluated in 
virtue of that which the agent employing the system is trying to attain, or what they value. 
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Stich’s criticism of the value of truth concerns strictly the idea that truth is of central 
normative importance in all cognition – it is not an all-encompassing attack on 
epistemologists’ endeavor to develop a theory that is, in some sense, the one that matches the 
truth of the matter. 
Furthermore, this is not necessarily the case. An epistemologist not concerned with the 
truthfulness of their theory may put no stock in truth even in their own evaluations of any 
cognitive systems. Such an epistemologist may once again only value their own happiness. In 
evaluating any cognitive system, they wouldn’t have to concern themselves with whether the 
cognitive system under evaluation is actually conducive to producing the things that the agent 
in question values. Such an epistemologist would be content with recommending any 
cognitive system that they are happy to believe will cause an agent to attain the things that the 
agent values. If their own happiness is the only relevant concern, then there is nothing wrong 
with this. There is also nothing wrong with an epistemologist trying to develop a theory with 
some satisfactory degree of truth-likeness, to value truth in their work. However, truth-
conduciveness is not a pre-eminent epistemic value that makes or brakes any cognitive 
system.  
3.2.4 How Kornblith fails to overcome Stich’s attack on the value of truth 
A final point to make is that my use of the word ‘truth’ in the preceding was a cautious one, 
and it may just as easily stand for some anti-realist account of truth, or for TRUTH*, or any 
other alternative. Kornblith seems to favor some form of scientific realism (cf. Kornblith 
2002: 157), but in his criticism of Stich, he doesn’t get any more specific, and neither does he 
consider that whatever account of truth he favors may itself be problematic for any of the 
reasons that Stich mentions. Never does he consider why true beliefs might not be as valuable 
as usually thought of. It is not because we have simply other things we value besides truth, but 
because the very notion of truth itself, when applied to our beliefs via some interpretation 
function, is partial and idiosyncratic. That is because the acceptable linking of our mental 
states to something with semantic properties is derived from our commonsense intuitions, 
which is a practice that Kornblith himself is also critical of. 
It is entirely in line with Kornblith’s view to say that the pre-theoretic intuitions underlying 
the commonsense understanding of truth were instrumental in the earlier stages of 
epistemology. They offered a quick and mostly reliable way to distinguish true beliefs from 
false ones. However, Kornblith doesn’t take the next step. He completely disregards the 
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possibility that the commonsense truth-conduciveness to which he gives a pre-eminent place 
in all cognitive evaluation, might not hold up as a proper theoretical category. Yet this is 
exactly the kind of criticism he mounts against the more traditional projects of epistemology. 
That his understanding of truth-conduciveness might not exhibit a good theoretical unity, can 
be seen by once again considering cognitive pluralism and evaluative-concept pluralism. The 
way people go about their cognition is significantly diverse, and as we’ve seen, this diversity 
cannot be easily chalked up to linguistic divergence or other similar considerations. If we are 
to do normative work in epistemology, we must find some way to properly evaluate these 
diverging cognitive strategies. Stich and Kornblith agree that the agent’s goals should play 
some role here, but for Kornblith, truth will always be pre-eminent. From evaluative-concept 
pluralism, we know that people’s epistemic intuitions also diverge significantly. Any 
intuitively sanctioned interpretation function mapping brain-states to the world is therefore 
going to be partial and idiosyncratic. However, epistemic norms according to Kornblith are 
universal hypothetical imperatives. Why should cognitive systems that produce more true 
beliefs, rather than TRUE**...* beliefs, then be evaluated higher? Kornblith might say that 
relevant to the ‘knowledge’ and ‘cognitive systems’ he is talking about, it is the regular true 
beliefs that matter. But aren’t we then back to Sosa-style conceptual analysis? In addition to 
being at odds with Kornblith’s own criticism of such an approach, this would be difficult to 
defend as a normative project of cognitive evaluation, as the very thing under evaluation – 
cognition – doesn’t seem to manifest uniformly throughout the population. 
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Conclusion 
The empirical findings of cognitive and evaluative-concept pluralism show respectively that 
people go about the business of cognition in significantly varied ways and that people employ 
different epistemic concepts and judgments when evaluating cognition. Cognitive pluralism 
thus raises the question of how we are to evaluate different cognitive systems, and evaluative-
concept pluralism undermines one of the common answers to this question: conceptual 
analysis. 
For the issue of cognitive evaluation to have any real substance, it must be shown that there 
actually is some significant and systematic diversity in the ways that people go about their 
cognition. Conceptual arguments against the possibility of cognitive pluralism, properly 
understood, follow the capricious contours of intentional describability, which itself turns on 
the described agent’s similarity to us. This amounts to unmotivated epistemic chauvinism. 
Evolutionary arguments on the same theme, however, greatly overestimate the power of 
natural selection and its control over the development of cognition. These considerations, 
coupled with relevant empirical evidence, make a good case for cognitive pluralism. 
Faced with cognitive pluralism, any epistemological theory hoping to retain its normativity 
will have to offer a good account of how these different cognitive strategies should be 
evaluated. The answer to this question from the field of analytic epistemology insists that we 
should look at how well they fare as explications of our pre-theoretic intuitions. Evaluative-
concept pluralism shows that the intuitions commonly adhered to in epistemology, are highly 
idiosyncratic, and this raises the question of why we should favor the theories built up from 
the basis of some certain idiosyncratic intuitions in the face of all the alternatives. If we are 
interested in the normative project of evaluating cognition in general, we shouldn’t simply 
restrict the domain of our theories to the concepts evoked in a philosophy class. 
Hilary Kornblith’s naturalized account of epistemology seems to overcome these problems, 
while avoiding the charge often mounted against naturalized epistemology – that it strips 
epistemology of its normative character. In Kornblith’s view, normativity in epistemology is 
tied to the truth-conduciveness of our cognitive systems. Stephen Stich shows this to be 
unmotivated: when viewed clearly, true beliefs fail to have nearly as much value as usually 
thought of. A more viable theory of cognitive evaluation is thus a pragmatic one, which places 
center-stage the things that an agent actually intrinsically values. 
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Kornblith’s criticism of Stich’s view shows Kornblith to place the normativity of his view on 
second-order beliefs. While his contention that a truth-reliable cognitive system is always 
conducive to attaining whatever the agent values is easily shown to not hold, the value of truth 
can be somewhat saved when considering second-order beliefs about the beliefs of the agent 
under evaluation. However, that too is only so if truthfulness is something that the evaluator 
wishes to attain. In all this, Kornblith seems to ignore the bulk of Stich’s attack on the value 
of true beliefs, which makes his take on the normativity of truth in epistemology all the more 
difficult to save in the face of any alternative TRUTH**...*-linked accounts. 
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Tõe normatiivne roll kognitiivsete süsteemide hindamisel 
Kognitiivne paljusus on tees, mille kohaselt leidub inimeste mõtlemisviiside vahel olulisi ja 
süstemaatilisi erinevusi. See tees on ühtlasi saanud ka palju empiirilist kinnitust. Vastukaaluks 
on sellele aga esitatud argumente, mille kohaselt on kognitiivne paljusus kas kontseptuaalselt 
või bioloogiliselt võimatu. 
Kontseptuaalsed argumendid eeldavad tugevat sidet agendi ratsionaalsuse ja tema 
intentsionaalse kirjeldatavuse vahel, ning Stephen Stich on näidanud, kuidas see viimane on 
sellistes argumentides mõtestatud läbi agendi sarnasuse iseendale. See osutub aga 
põhjendamatuks ning analüütiliselt väärtusetuks määratluseks, mida on kerge ületada võttes 
kasutusele lihtsalt vähem šovinistlik sõnavara. Kui kognitiivne paljusus on aga vastuvõetav, 
siis tõstatab see meile olulise küsimuse sellest, kuidas neid erinevaid mõtlemisviise või 
kognitiivseid süsteeme hinnata. Olukord on veel raskendatud tänu tõigale, et empiirilist 
kinnitust on leidnud ka hannanguliste-kontseptsioonide paljusus, mis ütleb, et kognitiivsete 
süsteemide hindamisel rakendavad erinevad inimesed oluliselt ja süstemaatiliselt erinevaid 
episteemilisi kontseptsioone ja hinnanguid. See seab kahtluse alla analüütilise epistemoloogia 
metodoloogilise võtte kontrollida enda teooriaid läbi selle, kuivõrd hästi nad vastavad meie 
eelteoreetilistele intuitsioonidele.  
Kuna inimeste episteemilised intuitsioonid ei ole ühtsed, siis seab nende järjepidav 
kasutamine teatud epistemoloogilistes projektides kahtluse alla nende projektide normatiivse 
külje. Stich nimetab selliseid projekte etno-epistemoloogiaks, ning ka Hilary Kornblith on 
epistemoloogia kui kontseptuaalse analüüsi suhtes kriitiline – tema meelest peaks uurimus 
teadmisest uurima teadmist ennast, mitte selle kontseptsiooni. Ka Kornblithi jaoks on 
epistemoloogia normatiivsus tähtis küsimus, ning tema jaoks mängib siinpuhul keskset rolli 
tõde.  
Seisukoht, et kognitiivsete süsteemide hindamisel on esmaseks kriteeriumiks nende tõesus, on 
vägagi levinud, ning üldjuhul ei eitada tõe väärtust meie kognitsioonis. Stich vaidleb aga, et 
tõesed uskumused ei ole miski, mida oleks eriliselt väärtuslik omada. Seejuures pole nad 
väärtuslikud ei iseenesest ega ka instrumentaalselt. Seda seetõttu, et meie tavamõistuslik 
arusaam tõest, rakendatuna meie uskumustele, toetub kultuuritundlikele eelteoreetilistele 
intuitsioonidele. Omistamaks meie mentaalsetele seisunditele (nt uskumustele) semantilisi 
omadusi, peame me nad kaardistama vastavatele semantiliselt kirjeldatavatele 
propositsioonidele, tõekriteeriumitele jms. Igasugune tõlgendusfunktsioon, mis vastab 
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tavamõistuslikele intuitsioonidele, on aga paratamatult piiratud ja idiosünkraatiline. 
Tavapärased tõesed uskumused, mida me väärtustame, on seega erilise väärtusega vaid 
seetõttu, et nad vastavad tavamõistusele ja kinnitavad traditsiooni. Erinevate intuitsioonide 
või üldse teiste aluste baasilt loodud tõlgendusfunktsioonid võiksid meile aga pakkuda 
pragmaatiliselt väärtuslikemaid kognitiivseid süsteeme. Kuna ei ole lihtne näidata, miks tõde 
on väärtuslikum kui mingi alternatiivne TÕDE*, siis peaks kognitiivsete süsteemide 
hindamisel keskenduma sellele, mida agent iseenesest väärtustab ja kuivõrd erinevad 
kognitiivsed süsteemid teda nende asjadeni viia võiksid. 
Kornblith-i jaoks jääb tõde aga endiselt esmaseks. Ta nõustub küll Stich-iga, et meie 
kognitiivsed süsteemid peaksid täitma meie soovitud eesmärke, kuid seejuures jääb  
Kornblith-i arusaama järgi keskseks endiselt küsimus sellest, kas meie vaadeldavad 
süsteemida ka tõepoolest agendi oma soovitud eesmärkideni viivad. Seejuures paigutab 
Kornblith enda teooria normatiivse külje teise tasandi uskumuste valda, kus esmase 
tähtsusega igasuguse kognitiivse süsteemi hindamisel on see, et meil kui hindajatel oleks 
tõesed uskumused nii vaadeldava süsteemi, selle kasutaja kui ka olukorra kohta. Selline vaade 
ei ole aga vastuolus Stich-iga, kelle jaoks on täpne olukorra hindamine niisama tähtsal kohal. 
Seda aga vaid siis, kui see täpsus on miski, mida hindaja ka väärtustab. On aga selge, et iga 
kognitiivse süsteemi puhul ei ole vajalik, et see toodaks tõeseid uskumusi. Näiteid, kus 
rohkem tõeseid uskumusi tootvad süsteemid agendi enda soovitud eesmärkidest eemale 
viivad, on lihtne konstrueerida. Peale selle ei pööra Kornblith suurt tähelepanu kogu Stich-i 
tõe-kriitika sisulisele küljele. Näitamata, kuidas ’tõde’ tema arusaama järgi on väärtuslikum 
kui TÕDE*, paistab tema vaade jäävat teatavale intuitsioonide tasandile. See on aga miski, 
mille suhtes on Kornblith ka ise kriitikat üles näidanud. 
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